Flat handover delay, missing amenities to cost builder Rs 2L

THANE: A builder has been fined Rs 2 lakh for the delay in handing over possession of three flats to the two buyers and non-compliance of a written promise to provide basic amenities to the residents of Hill Palace building near Upvan Lake here. The Thane District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum also directed the builder, M/s Patsons Engineers, to pay Rs 10,000 towards cost of legal expenses borne by the two buyers and an additional Rs 1,000 for failing to provide the piped gas line to their flats as the builder had promised initially in 2006.

President of the consumer forum, R B Somani, and member Jyoti Iyer ruled in favour of the two residents—Priyank Kumar and Kiran Madhav Prasad—who had dragged the builder for lapses.

It is learnt that the builder had assured to hand over the flats in May 2006 and also offered a string of amenities, including a safety door, power back-up and borewell facility within the premises of the high-rise overlooking the Yeoor forest in Thane (West).

The two had approached the builder in Feb 2006 and were convinced into buying three flats of different sizes. An upfront payment of Rs 10.80 lakh, Rs.17.55 lakh and Rs.10.80 lakh respectively was made to the builder, who assured them of flat possession by May 2006. Besides a collective Rs 39.15 lakh paid by the duo to the builder, they also shelled out Rs 2.13 lakh towards miscellaneous expenses.

Thirty-three months after the promised date of possession, the builder handed over keys to the flats in April 2009. Not just that, the flats were a far cry from what was promised—safety door, power back-up, borewell, etc were missing from the new flats and neither was any possession certificate or an Occupation Certificate issued.

The Forum ruled it as “unfair trade practice and sheer deficiency in services” on part of the builder.

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If the period of lease exceeding 12 years, the income is assessable under the head “Income from house property”

By Legal Bureau, Accommodation Times

Famous question under the law to decide the income from House Property or from Business Income. This case have identified a unique solution for the tenancy which is carried on beyond 12 years on month after month and two separate lease agreement produced to prove it, the Honble Court had this historic judgement in favour of Assessee.
HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Commissioner of Income-tax-9
v.
Pelican Investments (P.) Ltd.
IT Appeal No. 3424 of 2010
August 21, 2012
JUDGMENT

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S.J. Vazifdar, J. – This is an appeal under section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, against the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dated 30th October, 2009, dismissing the appellant’s appeals, ITA Nos. 1611/Mum/2008 and 4730/Mum/2008, pertaining to assessment years 2004-05 and 2005-06, respectively. The present appeal pertains to ITA No.1611/Mum/2008.
2. The appeal is admitted on the following substantial questions of law and heard finally :
(A) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Hon’ble Tribunal in law was right in holding that the rent and compensation of Rs. 60,27,027/- received by the assessee is to be charged under the head business income and not under the head “Income from House Property” as held by the Assessing Officer in the order under section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961?
(B) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Hon’ble Tribunal was justified in following its orders for assessment year 2003-2004 treating the rental income under the head “Profits and gains from business”, ignoring the provisions of section 27(iiib) read with section 269 UA(f) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, according to which, the period of lease exceeding 12 years, the income is assessable under the head “Income from house property” in assessment year 2003-2004 and onwards?

The question sought to be raised in paragraph 6.3 of the appeal was not pressed.
3. The respondent – assessee filed its return of income on 29th October, 2006, declaring a total loss of Rs. 48,626/-. The Assessing Officer made an order under section 143(3). The annual value under section 23(1)(a) was computed at Rs. 60,27,027/-. A deduction under section 24 at 30% amounting to Rs. 18,08,108/- was allowed. He, accordingly, assessed a sum of Rs. 42,18,919/- to be income from house property.

4. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) allowed the respondent’s appeal against the inclusion of compensation received in respect of agreements under the head “Income from house property” on the basis of the previous decision of the Commissioner of Income Tax for the assessment year 2003-04 and the fact that there were no change in circumstances since then. The Tribunal upheld the order in this regard.

5. Mr. Vimal Gupta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the respondent is deemed to be the owner of the property licenced to it by Hotel Leelaventure Limited as the license was for a period not less than twelve years. Accordingly, the compensation paid to the respondent by the sub-licencees constituted income from house property. He relied upon sections 22, 27(iiib) and 269UA(d) and (f) of the Act, which read as under :-

“Income from house property.
22. The annual value of property constituting of any buildings or lands appurtenant thereto of which the assessee is the owner, other than such portions of such property as he may occupy for the purposes of any business or profession carried on by him the profits of which re chargeable to income-tax, shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head “Income from house property”.
“Owner of house property”, “annual charge, etc. defined-

27. For the purposes of section 22 to 26 —
……….
(iii-b) a person who acquires any rights (excluding any rights by way of a lease from month to month or for a period not exceeding one year) in or with respect to any building or part thereof, by virtue of any such transaction as is referred to in clause (f) of Section 269-UA, shall be deemed to be the owner of that building or part thereof;”

269UA — In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,—
……….
(d) “immovable property” means -
(i) any land or any building or part of a building, and includes, where any land or any building or part of a building is to be transferred together with any machinery, plant, furniture, fittings or other things, such machinery, plant, furniture, fittings or other things also.
Explanation. – For the purposes of this sub-clause, “land, building, part of a building, machinery, plant, furniture, fittings or other things” include any rights therein;
(f) “transfer”,—
(i) in relation to any immovable property referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (d), means transfer of such property by way of sale or exchange, or lease for a term of not less than twelve years, and includes allowing the possession of such property to be taken or retained in part performance of a contract of the nature referred to in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882).
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-clause, a lease which provides for the extension of the term thereof by a further term or terms shall be deemed to be a lease for a term of not less than twelve years, if the aggregate of the term for which such lease is to be granted and the further term or terms for which it can be so extended is not less than twelve years; …”
6. The question is whether in the facts of this case, it can be said that the period of the licence created in favour of the respondent exceeded twelve years as contended on behalf of the appellant.
7. (A) By an agreement dated 7th November, 1984, Hotel Leelaventure Limited (HLL) granted the respondent (referred to therein as the Sole Concessionaire), a licence in respect of an area admeasuring about 450 square meters on the terms and conditions stated therein.

Clauses 1 and 4 (i)(a) thereof read as under :

“(1) The Hotel Company hereby gives to the Sole Concessionaire (Respondent) and the Sole Concessionaire takes from the Hotel Company on licence basis the said shopping arcade for a period of 11 years commencing from the date of occupation certificate of the shopping arcade.
……….

(4) The Sole Concessionaire shall observe and perform the following terms and conditions and stipulations, namely :
(i)(a) To pay to the Hotel company compensation for the said licence commencing from the date of occupation certificate, at the rate of Rs. 150/- per sq. mtr. per month during the period of the licence and pro-rata compensation for any broken period, which compensation shall be paid monthly on or before the 10th day of the month following the month for which it is due and for any broken period at the end of such period.”

(B) The occupation certificate of the shopping arcade was obtained on 28th November, 1987. The agreement, therefore, came to an end on 27th November, 1998 i.e. 11 years from the date of the occupation certificate in respect of the shopping arcade.

8. It is important to note that under the agreement, the respondent was not entitled to renew the same upon the expiry of the period of 11 years from the date of the occupation certificate of the shopping arcade. It is also important to note that this agreement was entered into before the above provisions of the Act came into force. Section 27(iiib) and 269UA(f) came into force with effect from 1st April, 1988 and 1st October, 1996, respectively. It cannot, therefore, be said that the agreement was structured by the parties thereto to get over the said provisions.

9. Thereafter, the respondent and HLL entered into a fresh agreement dated 24th January, 1999, by which HLL granted the respondent (referred to therein as the Sole Concessionaire) a licence in respect of the same premises. The last recital and clauses 1 and 4(i)(a) of the agreement read as follows :

“AND WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to enter into a further agreement w.e.f. 28th November, 1998.”
“(1) The Hotel Company hereby gives and the Sole Concessionaire and the Sole Concessionaire takes from the Hotel Company on licence basis the said shopping arcade for a period of 10 years commencing from 28th November, 1998.
……….

(4) The Sole Concessionaire shall observe and perform the following terms and conditions and stipulations, namely :

(i)(a) To pay to the Hotel company compensation for a period of three years commencing upto 31/03/2001 at the rate of Rs. 150/- per sq. mtr. per moth and thereafter for a period upto 28th November, 2008 at the rate of Rs. 250/- per sq. mtr., per month and pro-rata compensation for any broken period, which compensation shall be paid monthly on or before the 10th day of the month following the month for which it is due and for any broken period at the end of such period.”
The duration of this agreement was 10 years. The consideration was also substantially enhanced.

10. Mr. Gupta submitted that the sum of the duration of the licence under the two agreements ought to be considered for the purpose of section 269UA(f). If that was so, the duration of the licence would be for 21 years. The above provisions would then stand attracted.

11. The submission, however, is not well founded. Firstly, it was not contended that the agreements were a camouflage to conceal a licence of twenty one years or to circumvent the said provisions of the Act. Indeed, that could not have been the case. As we noted earlier, the first agreement was entered into on 7th November, 1984 before the provisions came into force. Section 27(iiib) and 269UA(f) came into force with effect from 1st April, 1988 and 1st October, 1996, respectively.

12. There was no connection whatsoever between the two agreements. The appellant has not indicated any factors which would establish any connection between the two agreements. They have not been able to indicate any factors on the basis of the agreements or even otherwise which would indicate that the latter agreement was a continuation of the first agreement. Nor have they been able to establish that at the time of entering into the first agreement, the parties had agreed or even contemplated entering into a further agreement for any duration at all.

13. On the other hand, the agreements establish beyond doubt that they are separate and distinct. For instance, neither the respondent nor HLL had a right to renew the first agreement. This is the clearest indication that the subsequent agreement was separate and distinct and was entered into on the basis of fresh negotiations.

14. The important terms and conditions of the agreements viz. the duration and the consideration are also different. The duration of the licence under the first agreement was 11 years, whereas it is for a period of 10 years under the subsequent agreement. More important is the fact that the consideration under the second agreement is substantially higher than under the first agreement. It is obvious that the consideration was negotiated afresh. There is not even a whisper in the first agreement about any subsequent agreement.

15. Section 269UA(f) does not operate differently merely because the licencee under different agreements is the same. It is always open to a licensor and a licencee to enter into different agreements for different periods. There is nothing in the above provisions that warrants the periods under the various agreements being clubbed.

16. The mere fact that the same licencee continues under consecutive agreements would make no difference. If a licencee enters into a fresh agreement upon the expiry of the earlier agreement, it would be pointless his vacating the premises and immediately reoccupying it. That would be an unnecessary, hollow formality. His not doing so cannot constitute two or more distinct agreements to be a single composite agreement even for the purpose of computing the duration of the period of the licence.

17. It would be a different matter altogether if it were established that the different licence agreements were, in fact, a camouflage for one composite agreement for a period of 12 years or more. That, at the cost of repetition, is neither the appellant’s case nor established on the basis of the record. The record, in fact, indicates the contrary.

18. Added to this is the fact that the department had accepted the respondent’s case throughout. It is only for the assessment years 2003-04 onwards that the present contention had been raised. There were, as noted by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), no change in circumstances which would warrant a different view being taken.

19. The questions are, therefore, answered in favour of the respondent – assessee.

20. In the circumstances, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

No more skimpy rents of SOBO residents:CM

By Accommodation Times Bureau

CM scrapping the laws of British-era and levy rent at 20% the prevailing market rate for the south Mumbai residents.

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Desponding news coming in way of the south Mumbai residents which says, that if you live in rented flats which are on government land, there is a possibility of increasing rent.
CM Prithviraj Chauhan wants to scrap the British-era land lease laws and introduce ne laws that sync with the current market rates. The gap is so wide, e.g a 570 sq meter land in Colaba whose lease is been expired in 1980 only have Rs.17.41 of yearly rent! Chauhan announced that the new rule constitute 3lakh Rs as a rent. Under this new law obviously several crores will be added to state depository.

Government is not forcing the current rates fully. It goes like this, the rent for residential purpose is increasing by 20%, for industrial purpose 25%, and commercial purpose 30%. The cabinet on Tuesday firstly proclaimed to abolish of the concept of 50 and 99 years lease tenure and bring it down to the period of 30 years. Chief Minister said that at present there are 1,282 lands on lease which have already completed the tenure period.

The government will see every property flats houses and reassessed annual rates every year. This is not for the first time government is huddling in legal battles. The first attempt was made in 1978 and in 1986. At the time of late Vilasrao Deshmukh our ex CM ruling the law did not materialize.

New tenure laws is been framed in keeping the parameters recommended by the Bombay High Court also it has gone through the laws of states like Gujarat.

NO NEED FOR DEVELOPERS NOC FOR FLAT SALE/ TRANSFER

Mumbai: In a major relief to flat buyers and society residents, the state government has said that there is no need for a no-objection certificate from the developer for sale or transfer of flat (resale) in a fully constructed building.  The state housing department has issued an official communication in this regard after coming across cases where developers illegally collected money from flat buyers for providing such NOCs.  The department claims to have received complaints stating that the developers had collected up to Rs 500 per sq ft in such cases of transfer. This means, for the sale or transfer of a 540 sq ft flat, buyers are forced to cough up an additional Rs 2.7 lakh or so. The department has said there was no requirement for NOC under norms mentioned in the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats Act (MOFA).  A housing department official said that MOFA norms requiring formation of the society and conveyance of the plot to the society within a stipulated time after completion are not being observed in a large number of cases. Recovery of illegal amounts in the name of NOC for sale or transfer of flats are being reported in several cases, the official added. The department has also written to the inspector general of registration, S Chockalingam, asking him to ensure that officials in the registration department register sale documents without insisting on the NOC from developers. The department says it has received complaints where officials have refused to register the documents without the NOC.  The Cidco, which has leased out a number of properties in Navi Mumbai, has also been asked to ensure that developers of these plots comply with MOFA norms. The department has sought Cidco’s opinion on whether its permission was needed for transfer/ sale of flats for plots leased by it. The department is of the opinion that the permission—insisted upon at present—is not required. The government has urged societies where developers haven’t conveyed plots within stipulated time to apply for deemed conveyance. Source:Times of India. Sandeep Ashar www.sevagiri.com

Hoarding on buildings now requires NOC from its top floor residents.

By Accommodation Times


A  Bombay high court division bench comprising of justice Mohit Shah and Justice Nitin Jamdar has ruled that any hoardings on top of the building will require the permission of top floor residents of the same building. The courts decision came after a gynecologist filled a PIL against illegal hoardings in the city. After this rule, even if all the residents of a building or members of the society agrees to put a hoarding, yet they are required to gain a no objection certificate(NOC) from the concerned affected person.

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The court also made a note that if incase the building residents refuses to give a nod, they can pursue the BMC and file their objections. The civic body will consider it after it hears to the objections of the advertisers and the building residents. The people concerned are also compelled to comply with the rules and must have an endorsement of the deputy municipal commissioner, without this any hoarding licenses would not be granted or renewed in the city.

Transfer of government land is now easy: PM

By accommodation Times Bureau

On the very next day of the RBI announcement of unchanged rates that had an effect on the real
estate sector, prime minister MR. Manmohan Singh is likely to ease one more headache.i.e the
transfers of government land. The pm has approved the changes in the land transfer policy for
government owned land.

A ban has been imposed last year on transfer of land to any private entity except from one
government department to another department. The ruled stated that, under the government
land transfer policy any entity that needs land to implement projects will first has to take
cabinet-approval. In the process of securing cabinet-aprproval takes long time thus delaying the
projects.

The goal of this new introduced rule is to basically kickstart the infrastructural projects that
are crucial for the country growth and boost the sentiment for the industry players who are
somewhere not happy with the government rates policy.

PM has also relaxed norms for land transfer on lease or rent or license which has been
appraised by PPP(private public partnership) and were approved by the finance minister
butofcourse depending upon the value of the projects. PM has also allowed to use the
land of railways under the RAIL LAND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY according to the Railway
Amendment Act.

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In a statement PM said, ‘’ this relaxation in the land transfer will only speed the private-public
partnership projects. All the PPP infrastructure projects-roads ,railways, ports, civil aviation
and metros have some element of land alienation as the projects is often built on government
owned land. The govt. continues to own the land which is leased or licensed out.

Delayed projects and delayed land acquisition have been often a complain of the players in the
real estate industry .

In all it’s a little of sugar splitting after a salt sprinkle.

552 new projects referred to MEoF for clearances

By Accommodation Times Bureau

Ministry of Environment and Forest (MEoF) have received 552 proposals for Environment permissions in and around Mumbai and Pune for Real Estate Development. Big names in the Real Estate industry have asked for the clearance and permission for Real Estate development work.

Though the process of clearances are on various stages like application, public hearing, environment assessment, apeals etc, these 552 big projetcs are likely to hit the Real Estate market very soon. Some of the projects have already started with their respective infrastructre work and securing the site with Patra boudaries and many have started the piling work also.

Many large projects and integrated townships are not going in for Environment Clearance and Permission on pretext that individual buildings or small sectors/ segments of land are been constructed. It will be a big issue after the completion of the building and occupants will have to seek the permission in place of builder as in the case of Occupancy Certificate (OC) and Building Completion Certificate (BCC).

In these 552 projects, large townships and commercial hubs are been planned. The list is available with Accommodation Times where big names were denied permission to some of the big projects they intend to announce near Dewali.

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Without any specific notification, Land within 8 kms of municipality limits deemed to be an ‘agricultural land’

It is not in dispute that the Central Government has not issued any notification in terms of section 2(14)(iii)(b). An agricultural land is not a capital asset; it becomes a capital asset if it is the land located under section 2(14)(iii)(a) & (b). Section 2(14)(iii)(a) covers a situation when the subject agricultural land is located within the limits of municipal corporation, notified arewww.sevagiri.coma committee, town area committee town committee of cantonment committee and which has a population of not less than 10,000.

Section 2(14)(iii)(b) covers the situation where the subject land is not only located within the distance of 8 kms. from the local limits, which is covered by clause (a) to section 2(14)(iii), but also requires the fulfilment of the condition that the Central Government has issued a notification under this clause for the purpose of including the area up to 8 kms. from the municipal limits to render the land as a ‘Capital Asset’.  In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the subject land is not located within the limits of Municipal Corporation therefore, clause (a) to section 2(14)(iii) is not attracted.

However, though it is contended by revenue that it is located within 8 kms. within the municipal limits of City Municipal Corporation, in the absence of any notification issued under clause (b) to section 2(14)(iii) it cannot be looked in as a capital asset within the meaning of section 2(14)(iii)(b) also and, therefore, though the Tribunal may not have spelt out the reason as to why the subject land cannot be considered as a ‘capital asset’ by giving the very reason the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is nevertheless the correct conclusion.

HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

Commissioner of Income tax

v.

Madhukumar N. (HUF)

IT Appeal NO. 396 OF 2009

MARCH 29, 2012

UDGMENT

D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J. – In this appeal under Section 260A of the Income tax Act, 1961 [for short, 'the Act'] the revenue has questioned the correctness of the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore “C Bench, Bangalore passed on 27.02.2009 in ITA/No. 1043(Bang)/2008.

2. The assessee is a Hindu undivided family and the assessment year is 2005-06. The question is as to whether the agricultural land belonging to the family sold on 02.03.2005 for a total consideration of Rs. 52,00,000/- resulted in long term capital gain in a sum of Rs. 48,94,784/-.

3. The assessee claimed that the amount does not amount to capital gain as the sale was attributable to the agricultural land and not coming either within the limits of any municipality or within the distance of 8 kms, from any notified municipality or urban area.

4. This was the bone of contention between the assessee and the revenue and while the revenue took a stand that the subjected land was located within 8 kms,, of Dasarahalli City Municipal Council, The Tribunal chose to accept the version of the assessee placing reliance on the certificate issued by Dasanapura Gram Panchayath to the effect that the population of Adakemaranahalli village within whose limits the land was located was less than 10,000 and therefore opined that the subject land cannot be considered as one coming within the definition of capital asset under Section 2(14)(iii)(a) & (b) of the Act.

5. Aggrieved by this order of the Tribunal, the present appeal by the revenue.

6. Sri. K.V. Aravind, learned standing counsel appearing for the appellants revenue has vehemently urged that the Tribunal has committed a mistake in choosing to rely upon a certificate issued by Dasanapura Gram Panchayath and ignoring the factum of the village being within 8 kms. limits of Dasarahalli City Municipal Council.

7. However, it is not in dispute that the Central Government has not issued any notification in terms of Section 2(14)(iii)(b) of the Act.

8. Mr. Arvind, learned counsel for the appellants places reliance on Section 2(14)(iii)(a) of the Act to contend that proposed Dasarahalli City Municipal Council is covered under Clause (a) of the Act i.e., lands within the limits of 8 kmts., from the boundary of the city municipal council etc.

9. An agricultural land in India is not a capital asset but becomes a capital asset if it is the land located under Section 2(14)(iii)(a) & (b) of the Act, Section 2(14) (iii) (a) of the Act covers a situation where the subject agricultural land is located within the limits of municipal corporation, notified area committee, town area committee, town committee, or cantonment committee and which has a population of not less than 10,000.

10. Section 2(14)(m)(b) of the Act covers the situation where the subject land is not only located within the distance of 8 kms from the local limits, which is covered by Clause (a) to section 2(14)(iii) of the Act, but also requires the fulfilment of the condition that the Central Government has issued a notification under this Clause for the purpose of including the area up to 8 kms, from the municipal limits, to render the land as a “Capital Asset.

11. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the subject land is not located within the limits of Dasarahalli City Municipal Council therefore, Clause (a) to section 2(14][iii] of the Act is not attracted.

12. However, though it is contended that it is located within 8 knits,, within the municipal limits of Dasarahalli City Municipal Council in the absence of any notification issued under Clause (b) to section 2(14)(iii) of the Act, it cannot be looked in as a capital asset within the meaning of Section 2(14)(iii)(b) of the Act also and therefore though the Tribunal may not have spelt out the reason as to why the subject land cannot be considered as a ‘capital asset’ be giving this very reason, we find the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is nevertheless the correct conclusion.

13. Therefore, we find no need to interfere in this appeal.

Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.

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Source: accommodation times

One more hurdle for the builders to climb

By Accommodation Times Bureau
By Nimisha Gupta

With all the clearance formality already in existence, the all new and pending projects will now
has to go under one more clearance test.i.e environment clearance.

The SEAC 1(state level appraisal committee ) that has already approved the projects in overall
Maharashtra with 554 projects, the new formed SEAC 2 only for MMR(Mumbai metro region)
will mainly look after the Mumbai region. Our honorable CM Mr. Prithviraj Chauhan with
consent of minister of state (independent charge) for environment and forests Mr. Jayanthi
Natrajan proposed the the ideas of having to committee to regulate.

The new formed SEAC 2 will have members from IIT sectors, retired BMC officials, MHADA
officials and the deputy secretary which will on the direction from the central government nod
there head for projects with the built-up area above 20,000sqft. There are many construction
in the pipeline in regions of Thane, Raigad and Mumbai –suburbs that accords the clearance
certificates from the committee.

Some of the factors that will be considered while appraising the construction projects are total
built-up area, energy conservation measure, water requirement, rain water harvesting, green
area , sewage treatment plant, solid waste management and environment management plan.

Special General Body Meeting not needed to pass Redevelopment Process of the society

By Accommodation Times Bureau
As submitted by Advocate K K Ramani.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION


WRIT PETITION NO. 10285 OF 2009


Harsha Co­op. Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. .. Petitioners


Vs.
Kishandas S. Rajpal & Ors. .. Respondents


Mr. A. S. S. Murthy i/b Mr. A. P. Steenson i/b A. P. Steenson & Associates
for the Petitioners. Mr. N. N. Bhadarshete for Respondent Nos.1 & 2. Mr. R.
M. Patne AGP for Respondent No.3.


CORAM : MRS. R. S. DALVI, J. DATE


The petitioners are the co­operative society, several of its members and


the developers of the society premises. The respondents are father and son


who constitute one member of the society (respondent). The society passed


a resolution for development of its premises on 26.08.2008. This resolution


came to be passed pursuant a notice of that meeting given on 20.08.2008


which in turn came to be given in view of letter signed by 7 out of 12


members of the society setting out 8 issues relating to proper functioning of


the society which was required to be attended by the Chairman.


One of the matters on the Agenda of the Meeting mentioned in the


notice of the meeting was the “repair request all the members”. This was


inter alia discussed at the meeting. The resolution of the society shows that


the society building was in dilapidated condition and “beyond repairs”. The


members took a decision for the “redevelopment of the society building”. In


the said meeting the members discussed various offers of various developers


and builders such as Mohini Sheltors, Mayfair, sheth, Capital Square,


Radhakishan Construction. The members discussed various offers and


directed the committee members to investigate about short­listed developers


and take steps for redevelopment of the society.


It was contended by the respondent that passing of such a resolution is


illegal because under bye­ law No.97 the Special General Body Meeting


could not transact any business other than what was mentioned in the notice


A dispute therefore came to be filed for declaration that the resolution


was illegal and for grant of injunction restraining the society from acting


upon it. The injunction was refused by the Co­operative Court and granted


by the Co­operative Appellate Court, Mumbai.


It is contended on behalf of the respondents that since the agenda


was “repair” of the building premises, “redevelopment” of the premises and


granting the contract to Mohini Sheltors as developers of the society


building was outside the purview of the bye­law No.97.


A reading of the letters received by the Managing Committee setting


out the issues to be discussed, the notice of the meeting for that purpose and


the actual meeting held to discuss the issues which inter alia was the repair


of the society premises cannot show that the decision of the members upon


deliberation of the meeting that the society premises was beyond repairs and


must be redeveloped after investigation of the short listed developers is


outside the purview of the bye­law No.97.


For each of the specific steps to be taken in ultimately deciding the


repairs/redevelopment of the society building and premises, separate matters


on the agenda need not be shown and separate meetings need not be held.


The petitioner society is a small housing society consisting of 12


members. 11 out of those members have consistently agreed for


redevelopment since the meeting held on 26.08.2008. In that meeting they


required the investigation of the short­listed developers only. Pursuant to the


wishes of the members, are short listed developer was deemed fit to develop


It is not disputed that the society building premises is dilapidated. Yet


the respondents did not agree with the redevelopment of the society


premises by the short­listed developer. That, of course, was his privilege and


choice. However, since he was in an absolute minority, the wishes of the


society members in an absolute majority was required to be exceeded to.


10. It is argued on his behalf that by Government Notification issued under


Section 79­A of the Maharashtra Co­operative Societies Act (the Act), a


registered architect on the panel of the Government was to be selected and


the procedure as shown therein required to be complied which is not done


and which vitiated decision of the society.


11. The reliance upon the Government Notification is itself misplaced.


When the members of the co­operative housing society which, under law of


co­operation, decides by a majority of 11:1 members that the society


premises be developed in a particular fashion by a particular developer, it


would be contrary to principles of democracy by which the society is


governed, for the sole dissenting member to interfere and require a


procedure, not required by the majority of the members to be followed


which would only consume time and be


Government Resolution would be required to be followed by the society


where the members are unable to come to any decision by a resolution of


12. The petitioners’ society having been injuncted from carrying out the


wishes of its members for the redevelopment of its society by the impugned


injunction order sought to hold a fresh election for its new managing


committee. The new committee came to be appointed by a fresh election on


25.09.2009. The new managing committee gave a new notice to hold a


Special General Meeting of the society on 30.10.2009. The respondent was


given notice. Members at that meeting agreed with the earlier decision.


Consequently the impugned order became infructuous. Nevertheless the


impugned order is challenged.


13. The respondent as a member would have a right to appear at the


meeting. Consequently though it was stated that he was given notice of the


meeting but failed to appear, the Court directed the society and all the


members once again meet and consider the aspect of the redevelopment of


the society premises on 7th March, 2010. It was mentioned to the Court that


the respondent had three other offers which were far superior and hence it


was considered in the fitness of things to reconsider of all these offers


14. The society meeting has been held yesterday. The respondent as well as


other members have attended. Four offers including the offer of Mohini


Sheltors together with certain amendments have been considered. The


respondents have produced a columnar statement of the four offers.


15. It is contended on behalf of the respondent that, a look at the columnar


statement shows that all of the respondent’s three offers are better than that


16. The columnar statement shows that all the three developers have


offered to construct only the residential premises of the society whereas


Mohini Sheltors has offered to construct commercial and residential


premises. It need hardly be stated that the commercial premises on the


ground floor of the building would itself enure for the benefit of the


17. The absolute advantage shown by way of absolute figure is in clause 8


of the columnar statement in which one of the offers of the respondent


shows the corpus which will be created at the rate of 7,500 per square foot


of the carpet area of the members. Advocate on behalf of the respondent


mentioned that the respondent would obtain Rs.23.33 lacs and the entire


society would obtain Rs.2.80 crores by that offer. To see the bonafides of


the offer, the respondent was directed to call upon his offerer to deposit


Rs.2.80 crores in the Court. Advocate on behalf of the respondent stated that


no such deposit can be made.


18. The other aspects of the offer in the columnar statement show


percentage amount which are not tangible to reconsider.


19. The members have decided once again by a majority of 10:2 to confirm


the offer of Mohini Sheltors. The Court is not, therefore, required to


interfere with the wishes of the majority of the members. The members do


not seek to act upon the resolution passed in the meeting dated 26.08.2008.


The impugned order has become infructuous. The injunction granted under


impugned order is set aside. The members have resolved to redevelop their


society building premises. The Court cannot interfere with such resolution.


The Writ Petition is disposed of with the above clarification as the


impugned order is infructuous.


respondent is taken on record.www.facebook.com

SEVAGIRI REAL ESTATE CONSULTANTS ,

By Accommodation Times Bureau
Appellants are engaged in business of manufacturing Ready Mix Concrete (RMC). While supplying the goods they delivered it at the desired location on site by pumping of the RMC to the spot where it was required. Revenue has made out a case that this activity is covered under ‘Commercial & Industrial Construction Services’ and imposed service tax on the entire consideration received for RMC after allowing the abatement of 67% under Notification No.l/06-ST.

The submission of the appellant is that this activity is part of the sale transaction and it is not part of any construction services. The counsel submits that the same issue was considered by the Tribunal in the case of GMK Concrete Mixing (P.) Ltd. v. CST [Final Order No. ST/591/2011 (PB), dated 4-11-2011]. He also submits that the same issue was decided by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of ACC Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [STRP No. 124 of 2011(Tax) and STRP Nos. 146-156 of 2011, dtd. 25.08.11.] The submission of the counsel is that since the issue has been decided by the Tribunal and a High Court, the matter may be decided without pre-deposit and the appeal itself may be decided on the basis of above decisions.

CESTAT, NEW DELHI BENCH

Ultratech Concrete

v.

Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi

FINAL ORDER NO. ST/A/476 of 2012-CUs

STAY ORDER NO. ST/S/714 OF 2012-cus

STAY APPLICATION NO. 31 OF 2012

SERVICE TAX APPEAL NO. 9 OF 2012

JUNE 12, 2012

ORDER

Mathew John, Technical Member – Appellants are engaged in business of manufacturing Ready Mix Concrete (RMC). While supplying the goods they delivered it at the desired location on site by pumping of the RMC to the spot where it was required. Revenue has made out a case that this activity is covered under ‘Commercial & Industrial Construction Services’ and imposed service tax on the entire consideration received for RMC after allowing the abatement of 67% under Notification No.l/06-ST.

2. The submission of the appellant is that this activity is part of the sale transaction and it is not part of any construction services. The counsel submits that the same issue was considered by the Tribunal in the case of GMK Concrete Mixing (P.) Ltd. v. CST [Final Order No. ST/591/2011 (PB), dated 4-11-2011]. He also submits that the same issue was decided by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of ACC Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [STRP No. 124 of 2011(Tax) and STRP Nos. 146-156 of 2011, dtd. 25.08.11.] The submission of the counsel is that since the issue has been decided by the Tribunal and a High Court, the matter may be decided without pre-deposit and the appeal itself may be decided on the basis of above decisions.

3. Ld. AR for the Revenue submits that though the matter appears to be covered by above two decisions, only stay petition may be allowed and Revenue may be given time to see whether there is any difference between the case already decided and this case.

4. Considered arguments of both the sides and we have studied the decisions and facts of the cases and we find that the facts are identical and there is nothing more to be decided in this appeal. Therefore after dispensing with the requirement of pre-deposit, we have taken up the appeal itself and we allow the appeal by setting aside the impugned order.

Builders to pay for the delayed possession of flats

By Accommodation Times Bureau


The Consumer forum had ordered developers to pay the rent of delayed flats or
give the possession as soon as they can. Delaying in handling over the ready flats
comes under unfair means of trade.


Mumbai suburban district consumer forum has directed one of the developer to
do the same. It had made him pay for 24 months and continue to do so.


The Maharashtra Ownership of Flats act by Law of land says that the developer
should make a full disclosure of marketability of title of the property including
any Encrumbrances,Rights,Claims,Disclosure , list of Amenities,Fixtures,Fitting
materials used.


Specify date by which possession of the flat would be given. On failure to give
possession the developer will be liable on demand to refund the amount along
with 90% interest per annum till date of refund.


One of the victim Vitthal Dhoke a Mahim resident booked a flat in Madhuban
building (Dahisar) E in August 2005, he paid Rs.1 lakh as a booking amount after
which he must be getting the possession of flats however he is yet to given.


Dhoke in November 2010 approached the consumer forum by CONSUMER
WELFARE ASSOCIATIONS to seek the possession of the flat he booked in
December 2008. The excuse of the developer was that because of the reservation
of a development plan and court matters he could not construct the A wing. The
forum investigated and found that the developer had not pre –conditioned any
road. The members, president Mr. JL DESHPANDE made it mandatory for the
developer to pay Rs.7,000 per month from June 2010 onwards and continue to
pay till the flat is handed over to him or make it sure he gets a flat in adjoining
vicinity. The forum also made it clear that Dhoke should get Rs 10,000 towards
cost of ligitation.


SEVAGIRI REALTORS(R)
9819659494/8286082860

Navi Mumbai Airport ,Sevagiri Realtors (R)

Source:

MUMBAI: The Navi Mumbai International Airportproject is "well on the way of being commissioned by 2014," Maharashtra Legislature was informed here today. 

The announcement was made by Governor K Sankaranarayanan in his address to the joint sitting of the Legislature. 

With a proposed capacity of 60 million passengers per year, this airport will be able to absorb the burgeoning air travel demands of the passengers, he said. 

Considering the traffic and transportation needs of Mumbai city, the Government has taken up Metro Rail and Mono- Rail Projects to enhance the public transport system and to provide efficient and commuter-friendly mass transit to commuters, he said. 

Preliminary survey for implementing the 32 km elevated Metro Line-2 from Charkop to Mankhurd has also been completed and work will be started very soon, he said. 

The Government has almost completed the work of all weather road connectivity of villages in the state, the Governor said. The Government has taken an ambitious programme of four laning of the National Highways in the state, he said.

No HRA Exemption on Rent reimbursed to employer for rent-free accommodation

No HRA Exemption on Rent reimbursed to employer for rent-free accommodation


By Accommodation Times Bureau
The assessee is getting twin benefit from the employer, one of which is not taxed on the basis of reimbursement of rent by the assessee to the employer. The first benefit is of rent free accommodation provided by the employer to the assessee employee for which the employer is incurring rental expenditure of Rs. 1.70 lacs per month in addition to providing interest free deposit of Rs. 40 lacs with the land lord. The 2nd benefit being received by the assessee is this that he is getting HRA of Rs.3 lacs approximately per month including special HRA of Rs.1.70 lacs per month. Against these two benefits being received by the assessee, the assessee is making one payment i.e. reimbursement of rentals to the employer company @ Rs.1.70 lacs per month. Now, this reimbursement of rent to the employer company of Rs.1.70 lacs per month is considered against the free housing accommodation provided by the employer company to the employee assessee, then this reimbursement of house rent to employer is no more available to be considered for exemption u/s 10(13A). As per Rule 3, the perquisite value of the housing accommodation provided by the employer company has to be worked out @ 15% of the salary or actual amount of lease rental paid by the employer whichever is lower as reduced by the rent if any actually paid by the employee. In the present case, 15% of the salary will be more than the actual rent being paid by the employee i.e. Rs.1.70 lacs per month and the same amount has been reimbursed by the employee to the employer and, therefore, perquisite value of hosing accommodation provided by the employer company to the employee assessee is ‘nil’ as per Rule 3 of the Income Tax Rules. But once, the housing perquisite value is worked out as ‘nil’ after considering this rental payment of Rs.1.70 lacs per month to the employer company, there is no rental payment made by the assessee employee for the purpose of working out exemption of HRA u/s 10(13A) of the Act and, therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the disallowance made by the A.O. regarding the claim of the assessee for exemption u/s 10(13A) is in order and, therefore, the order of Ld. CIT(A) resulting in deletion of disallowance is not sustainable. We, therefore, reverse the order of Ld. CIT(A) on this issue and restore that of the A.O.


IN THE ITAT AHMEDABAD BENCH ‘D’


Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax


v.


Kuldeep D. Kaura


IT APPEAL NO. 437 (AHD.) OF 2010


[ASSESSMENT YEAR 2006-07]


JUNE 15, 2012


ORDER


A.K. Garodia, Accountant Member – This is the Revenue’s appeal directed against the order of Ld. CIT(A)-VI, Baroda dated 13.11.2009 for the assessment year 2006-07.


2. The grounds raised by the revenue are as under:


“On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned C.I.T(A) erred:-


(1)  in directing the assessing officer to allow the claim of the assessee for exemption of HRA u/s. 10(13A) of the Act without appreciating that the assessee has not paid the rent directly to the landlord and hence the claim of the assessee is not covered under section 10(13A) of the Act.


(2)  in the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) ought to have upheld the order of the A.O.


(3)  It is, therefore, prayed that the order of the Id. CIT(A) may be set-aside and the order of the A.O may be restored.”


3. Brief facts of the case till the assessment stage of this issue are noted by Ld. CIT(A) in para 4.1 of his order which is reproduced below:


“During the assessment proceedings the appellant that he was an employee of Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd., Mumbai, and was paid H.R.A. for his leased accommodation. The employer had obtained residential flat at ground floor, No.3, Ruja Park, Juhu, Mumbai – 400 003, on leave and license basis vide Agreement dated 29-03-2004 with the landlord of flat Mr. Ramesh Khanna, The employer provided this fiat to the appellant for the appellant’s residential accommodation and recovered from the appellant’s salary the lease rent of Rs. 1,70,000/- on monthly basis which in turn employer paid to the landlord. The assessee claimed exemption for H.R.A. of Rs. 16,19, 940/- u/s. 10(13A) of the IT. Act, 1961 read with Rule 2A of the I.T. Rules. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the exemption claimed of Rs.16,19,940/- in respect H.R.A. received does not qualify for exemption U/s. 10(13A) of the Act as the appellant was allowed to occupy the leased accommodation provided by the employer for which the appellant was not paying any rent to the landlord directly.”


4. Being aggrieved, the assessee carried the matter in appeal before Ld. CIT(A) who deleted this disallowance made by the A.O. and now, the revenue is in appeal before us.


5. Ld. D.R. of the revenue supported the assessment order whereas, Ld. A.R. of the assessee supported the order of Ld. CIT(A). In the course of hearing before us, a query was raised by the bench regarding the benefit derived by the assessee from the employer in respect of accommodation and the Ld. A.R. was asked to submit the employment letter. He submitted photocopy of the employment letter dated 04.02.2004 which was rectified vide letter dated 06.12.2005 w.e.f. 01.04.2005. It was pointed out that as per the original employment letter dated 04.02.2004, he was supposed to get HRA @ 40% of the basic pay and in addition to this, he was to be provided residential accommodation at Udaipur for which he was to be charged @ Rs.6,000/- per month as rent and in case of relocation to Mumbai, he was eligible for a company leased accommodation for which the total cost of deposit for the house (calculated @ 10% and the monthly rent was fixed up to Rs. 1.5 lacs / month). As per the revised employment terms, w.e.f. 01.04.2005, he was to be given HRA @ 40% of the basic and in addition to this, he was allowed special HRA of Rs.1.70 lacs per month and the employer company was to give security deposit of Rs.40 lacs to the land lord. Pay slip for the month of March 2006 was submitted by the Ld. A.R. as per which, he was paid HRA of Rs. 3,10,020/- for this month and recovery was made on account of rent @ 1.70 lacs per month. It was pointed out by the bench that under these facts, assessee is getting double benefit i.e. free use of accommodation provided by the employer which was taken by the employer on lease and in addition to this the assessee is also getting HRA and against these two benefits, assessee is making payment of one rent of Rs. 1.70 lacs per month to the employer. It was pointed out by the bench that the assessee is getting two benefits out of which, one has to be taxed in any case because only one payment is being made by the assessee on account of rent. As the accommodation provided by the employer company was not added to the income of the assessee being the perquisite value of the house since the assessee has made the reimbursement of rent expenses incurred by the employer but then the same payment of rent to the employer company cannot be considered for the purpose of working out exemption against HRA u/s 10(13A) of the Income tax Act, 1961. The Ld. A.R. could not make any submission in this regard and he simply placed reliance on the judgement of Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Arun Kumar and Others v. Union of India as reported in 286 ITR 89 (S.C.).


6. We have considered the rival submissions, perused the material on record and have gone through the orders of authorities below. We find that in the present case, employer is making two payments of Rs. 1.70 lacs per month in addition to the payment of HRA to the assessee to the extent @ 40% of the basic pay. First payment is made by the employer company to the land lord from whom the accommodation was taken on lease by the employer company for the residence of the present assessee. In addition to this, the employer is making payment of special HRA to the assessee of Rs. 1.70 lacs per month in addition to the payment of HRA being paid by the employer to the assessee @ 40% of the basic pay. In addition to this, the employer company has provided deposit to the land lord of Rs. 40 lacs in respect of housing accommodation taken on lease by the employer company for the purpose of residence of the present assessee. The assessee employee is making payment of Rs. 1.70 lacs per month to the employer company towards reimbursement of rental expenses being incurred by the employer company and under these facts, no addition was made by the A.O. in the assessment order and by the assessee in the computation of income in respect of free or concessional housing accommodation provided by the employer u/s 17(2), because the rental expense incurred by the employer company has been reimbursed by the assessee to the employer company. Although in addition to rental expense incurred by the employer company, employer company has provided interest free deposits of Rs.40 lacs to the land lord for the purpose of taking on lease the housing accommodation for the purpose of residence of the present assessee, but no addition was made by the A.O. in respect of interest free deposit provided by the employer company to the land lord. There is no dispute on this aspect.


7. The dispute in the present case is that the assessee claimed exemption of HRA received by him from the employer company of Rs.3 lacs per month approximately. The exemption is claimed by the assessee u/s 10(13A) for the amount of reimbursement of rental expenses paid to the employer of Rs.1.70 lacs per month. The assessee claimed that he is eligible for exemption u/s 10(13A) and he claimed exemption of Rs. 16,19,940/-. This claim of the assessee was rejected by the A.O. on this basis that since the assessee is not paying rent to the land lord directly, he is not entitled to the benefit of Section 10(13A) of the Income tax Act, 1961. One more reason was given by the A.O. that since the assessee was allowed to occupy free accommodation provided by the employer for which the employer was paying rent as per the leased license agreement, the assessee’s claim of exemption u/s 10(13A) for a sum of Rs. 16,19,.940/- is denied and added to the total income of the assessee. Against this disallowance made by the A.O., this is the claim of the assessee that since the assessee is not occupying any housing accommodation owned by the assessee and the assessee is paying rent of Rs.1.70 lacs per month although not to the land lord directly but by way of reimbursement to the employer, the assessee is eligible for exemption u/s 10(13A) of the Act because such reimbursement of rent to the employer also amount to payment of rent by the assessee. Ld. CIT(A) decided this issue in favour of the assessee as per para 4.3 of his order which is reproduced below for the sake of ready reference:


“4.3 I have considered the submissions of the Id. AR and facts of the case and also seen the assessment order. Here, it is a case – where rent was paid by the employer-to-the-landlord and the same was recovered from the employee. The rental agreement between the landlord and the employer is for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the landlord. In big cities getting proper residential accommodation is very difficult when the employee approaches the landlord, hence this is the way how accommodation is procured and there is nothing new about it. The AO’s view that since employer is paying rent, even though the same is recovered from the employee, the employee is not entitled for exemption u/s 10(13A) of the Act in respect of HRA is ill founded. Prima facie, it appears from the facts that the appellant is eligible to claim exemption u/s 10(13A) of the Act in respect of HRA and as such the Assessing Officer was not justified in making addition and rejecting the claim of the appellant for exemption of HRA u/s. 10(13A) of the Act. Thus, in the given facts and circumstances, the AO is directed to allow the claim of the appellant and as such this ground of appeal is allowed.”


8. From the above para of the order of Ld. CIT(A), we find that he has proceeded to decide this issue on this basis alone that since the rental agreement between the land lord and the employer is for the purpose of interest of land lord and the rent is being reimbursed by the assessee employee to the employer, the assessee is eligible for exemption u/s 10(13A) of the Income tax Act, 1961. But he has not considered the 2nd objection of the A.O. that the assessee was allowed to occupy the leased accommodation provided by the employer for which the employer paid rent as per lease & license agreement and this was also one of the reasons given by the A.O. for disallowing the claim of the assessee u/s 10(13A) of the Act. We find that in the facts of the present case, the assessee is getting twin benefit from the employer, one of which is not taxed on the basis of reimbursement of rent by the assessee to the employer. The first benefit is of rent free accommodation provided by the employer to the assessee employee for which the employer is incurring rental expenditure of Rs. 1.70 lacs per month in addition to providing interest free deposit of Rs. 40 lacs with the land lord. The 2nd benefit being received by the assessee is this that he is getting HRA of Rs.3 lacs approximately per month including special HRA of Rs.1.70 lacs per month. Against these two benefits being received by the assessee, the assessee is making one payment i.e. reimbursement of rentals to the employer company @ Rs.1.70 lacs per month. Now, this reimbursement of rent to the employer company of Rs.1.70 lacs per month is considered against the free housing accommodation provided by the employer company to the employee assessee, then this reimbursement of house rent to employer is no more available to be considered for exemption u/s 10(13A). As per Rule 3, the perquisite value of the housing accommodation provided by the employer company has to be worked out @ 15% of the salary or actual amount of lease rental paid by the employer whichever is lower as reduced by the rent if any actually paid by the employee. In the present case, 15% of the salary will be more than the actual rent being paid by the employee i.e. Rs.1.70 lacs per month and the same amount has been reimbursed by the employee to the employer and, therefore, perquisite value of hosing accommodation provided by the employer company to the employee assessee is ‘nil’ as per Rule 3 of the Income Tax Rules. But once, the housing perquisite value is worked out as ‘nil’ after considering this rental payment of Rs.1.70 lacs per month to the employer company, there is no rental payment made by the assessee employee for the purpose of working out exemption of HRA u/s 10(13A) of the Act and, therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the disallowance made by the A.O. regarding the claim of the assessee for exemption u/s 10(13A) is in order and, therefore, the order of Ld. CIT(A) resulting in deletion of disallowance is not sustainable. We, therefore, reverse the order of Ld. CIT(A) on this issue and restore that of the A.O.


9. Now, we consider the applicability of the judgement of Hon’ble Apex Court cited by Ld. A.R. being the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Arun Kumar and others (supra). In that case, the dispute was regarding perquisite value of housing accommodation provided by the employer. In the present case, there is no dispute on this aspect and we have seen that the same was not taxable as per Rule 3 of the Income tax Rules 1962 and neither the assessee has declared any perquisite value of the housing accommodation provided by the employer nor any addition was made by the A.O. on this account and hence, this judgement is not applicable in the present case. In the present case, the dispute is regarding allowability of exemption u/s 10(13A) against receipt of HRA by the assessee employee which was never the dispute before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case cited by the Ld. A.R.

10. In the result, the appeal of the revenue stands allowed.